Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1969

Article 7

12-1969

Book Reviews
Law Review Staff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Law Review Staff, Book Reviews, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 191 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol23/iss1/7

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL

OF REFORM.

DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT

By Archibald Cox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1968. Pp. 144.
This is a deceptive book. It appears to be one more friendly
appraisal of the work of the Warren Court-this time from the recent
Solicitor General-surveying in giant steps and broad strokes its
decisions in six major areas within the short space of 135 pages. On
close reading it turns out to be a tough-minded essay written with
notable lucidity, analytical density, and high professional competence.
Moreover, it confronts directly and steadily the well-worn paradox or
dilemma of the Supreme Court of the United States which must be
both court and political institution, and it seriously attempts to
appraise the Court's performance in both roles. Although Professor
Cox writes of the Court with deep empathy and admiration, this is no
unbroken paean of praise; he is at numerous points critical of the
Court's performance. Indeed he is at times so critical that it brings to
mind that old adage about a man's mother being "his best.friend and
severest critic." Finally, he leaves the reader with a picture of the
Court's liberal momentum which is strikingly different from that
sketched by many of its critics, especially those critics in the popular
press or in the United States Congress.
Two quotes taken from consecutive pages are suggestive of the
ambivalence he shows, an ambivalence I suspect no full view of the
Court can escape. In his discussion of criminal procedure, after noting
that Churchill once observed that the methods used in the enforcement
of its criminal law were a chief measure of the quality of a nation's
civilization, Professor Cox goes on to say that, if so, "then the activism
of the Warren Court has enabled our civilization to give a vastly better
account of itself" (p. 88). In assessing the institutional costs of the
Court's reforms of state criminal procedure, he comments: "[T]he
rapidity of the doctrinal changes and the readiness of a bare numerical
majority of the justices to overturn recent precedents immediately upon
a change in the membership of the Court do no service to the ideal of
law as something distinct from the arbitrary preferences of
individuals" (p. 89).
Because of the care and clarity with which Professor Cox writes,
it is exceptionally easy to describe the structure and content of the
book. It falls evenly into six parts. A first chapter states the theme-the
paradox of the Court's role-and the remaining five chapters illustrate
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it. Contemporary problems of the Negro and the Constitution occupy
two chapters, one centering on direct judicial intervention and the other
on the Court's ratification of sources of federal legislative power. After
a fourth chapter reviewing the developments in criminal procedure, the
focus for the final two chapters turns to the Court's "intensely
conscious sense of judicial responsibility for the open and democratic
operation of the political system." One concluding chapter deals with
freedom of speech and association, the other with reapportionment and
voting.
The book escapes several pitfalls of such ventures. Professor Cox
avoids the blandness of the even-handed survey which can do little more
than digest recent developments. He does this by being selective about
what he treats, letting some topics such as obscenity and school
desegregation go virtually without comment; and he is emphatic about
the topics he does treat such as Reitman v. Mulkey,' Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 2 Time Inc. v. Hill,3 Berger v. New York,4 Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections.5 Within the brief compass of the book he thus
manages to take the time and space to express his own personal
reactions in some depth, making his survey singularly flavorsome.
Second, he maintains his "big" theme about the basic dilemma of the
Court so as to give the essay as a whole a fair degree of unity. Finally,
so far as I can judge, he manages the very difficult task of keeping his
text intelligible to the layman while holding it to high professional
competence for the lawyer. There is no bowdlerizing of the
complexities. Recent events such as the Fortas fiasco show how
important it is to have a serious public opinion about the role of the
Supreme Court in American life; this would seem pre-eminently the
aspect of law on which the understanding of the layman should be
cultivated. Yet the complexity of our constitutional inheritance has
been such as to make the enterprise seem impossible except perhaps for
the unique felicity of a book like Anthony Lewis's Gideon's Trumpet.
A chief importance of Professor Cox's book is to show that writing in
the large about the work and role of the Court at one and the same
time for the lawyer, who is forced thereby to look up, and for the
layman, who is forced thereby to look down, is possible.
Professor Cox is gallant in confronting directly and simply these
1. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
2.
3.
4.
5.

384
385
388
383

U.S. 641 (1966).
U.S. 374 (1967).
U.S.41 (1967).
U.S. 663 (1966).
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questions: What is the role of the Supreme Court today? How can we
judge whether it is performing well or badly? At the outset he states
his thesis (pp. 4-5):
In my view, constitutional adjudication presents an insoluble dilemma. The
extraordinary character of the questions put before the Court means that the
Court cannot ignore the-political aspects of its task-the public consequences of

its decisions-yet the answer to the question "what substantive-result is best for
the country?" -is often incofisistent with the responses obtained by asking "what
is the decision according to law?" The Court may incline to one direction or the
other, but no one could wisely and permanentlygrasp either horn of the dilemma.

The remarkable compression of Professor Cox's presentation
poses a pretty fair dilemma of its own for a reviewer. His rich
treatment of his thesis invites comment, yet unless the review is to be
more discursive than the book, prudence and self-restraint are required.
The following are ten observations about the book.
First, I am inclined to agree with the basic formulation. The
Supreme Court is, like the jury, an institution which defies a cool
blueprint. Its contemporary functions come not from some
organization chart but from that slow accretion of functions over time
which characterizes institutions which survive.'
Second, one is tempted to use his formula to account for the
division of labor and the difference in perspective between the law-man
and the political scientist, and to suggest that both sides miss part of
the data.
Third, the problem of role can arise only when policy and law are
seen as inconsistent. Because of the generous ambiguity of
constitutional law as law, the antimony will not be easy to detect in
any given case however attractive it is to assert in the large. How is
one to assess, for example, what the Court did in Gideon v.
Wainwright?7 Moreover, there is no reason why the inconsistency
should be frequent; one should at least guard against the impulse to
treat any result which is wholly desirable as a matter of substantive
policy as being somehow thereby suspect and impeached as a matter
of continuity of legal principle. Finally, we are warned that the only
time we can get a clear test of the Court's obedience to legal values is
when, wearing a judicial hair shirt, it refuses on behalf of such values
to endorse the better policy.
Fourth, although he is sensitive to the social needs to which the
Court was responding, Professor Cox is helpfully explicit about what
6. See, e.g., P. BLAU, THE DYNANIcs
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

OF BUREAUCRACY

(1963).
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he calls the "institutional costs," the counter-values on the law side.
There are four things to say quickly about the counter-values. One,
they are peculiarly within the province of professional law training.
Two, they are inevitably long-term values, while the social values they
compete against are likely to be short-term and urgent; indeed, given
the anemia of the institutional counter-values in contrast to the
glamour of the competing social needs, it is surprising that they ever
win. Three, the perception of them as values, in Cox's account, rests
on a proposition that is surprisingly behavioral. The public will accept
and obey mandates from the Court so long as they think of it as a
court speaking, as Learned Hand once put it, "with the mouth of
others" and not, to borrow a figure from Cox, as a bevy of Platonic
guardians. Presumably the argument is that if the Court were to
abandon altogether the "law" horn of Cox's dilemma, it would
become a very different institution. Possibly the public could be
educated t6 regard it as "a third house," but certainly this would
require radical changes in its non-democratic structure. And we would
be the poorer for having acquired an additional legislature that we did
not need at the price of eliminating a remarkable institution for lawmaking as a last resort. Four, one might well wonder how much the
craftsmanship of the Court's performance ever affects the public's view
of it, which must in the nature of things be gross-as though we wert
talking of the public image of the work of the brain surgeon. Professor
Cox manfully meets this challenge by asserting that craftsmanship in
the first instance affects the opinion of the bar and that "a large
segment of public opinion looks to lawyers" to appraise the Court's
performance. One can only 'brood about what would happen if these
very fundamental propositions about the legal order were subjected to
any sort of empirical inquiry'. it would be fun and important to try.
Fifth, it emerges as perhaps the cardinal sin for the Court to reach
a result which is both politic and within the law without, as Cox puts
it, regard 'for how it integrates the decision into the general body of
the law." Quite possibly a good deal of the current criticism of the
Court is criticism of results that could have been rationalized so as to
be decently integrated into the general body of the law.
Sixth, the institutional costs of judicial activism involve not only
long-term public respect but also basic changes in our constitutional
distribution of governmental powers, particularly as they affect the
equilibrium between national and state power. It is an essential Cox
theme that if there have been any victims of the Warren Court, they
have been the states and not the Congress.
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Seventh, one clue as to how the Court is handling its insoluble
dilemma falls peculiarly within the technical competence of the lawyer.
It concerns the Court's control of the occasions on which it will
adjudicate constitutional issues. The point Cox elaborates goes not to
the withering away of the doctrine of political questions or to the
administration of petitions for certiorari. It goes rather to a shift in
doctrines of judicial economy, affecting such topics as ripeness,
standing, avoidance of constitutional adjudication if alternative
grounds are available, and adjudication of the constitutionality of
legislation on its face. Quite apart from how it has decided
constitutional questions, the Warren Court has been characterized by
a greater appetite for taking them on.
Eighth, there are, of course, costs to be reckoned with if the Court
steadily refuses to intervene and stands frozen in its legal role. There
are, Cox argues, instances where if the Court will not act, no branch
of government will. Moreover, Cox suggests that when the Court
declines to interfere with an injustice because it is beyond its privince,
there is a risk that it will appear to the public to be ratifying or
legitimating the injustice. There is also the waste of the moral force the
Court can exercise far beyond its decree. Surely, the Brown v. Board
of Education' decision did more to affect national opinion on the
legitimacy of the Negro grievance in general than it did directly to
change school segregation. Finally, with an eye on the problems of race
relations Cox urgently reminds us that the law must deserve respect.
Ninth, there is the interesting matter of the tempo of change in
constitutional law. Although Professor Cox is emphatic about the
obligation to preserve continuity of legal principle and to avoid "great
leaps forward" in doctrine, he does not fully address himself to the
puzzle of -whether the Court can do anything it wishes so long as it does
it in small steps over time. Perhaps it can solve its insoluble dilemma
by generating constitutional law by the comnon law process; perhaps
its mission in American life is to make revolution slowly.
Tenth, and finally, it is the special virtue of the Cox book that he
does not accept the easy invitation-having posed the Court's task as
an insoluble dilemma-to retreat into a mystique about its
performance. He believes there are better and worse ways of handling
an insoluble dilemma, and the book is really an appraisal of how the
Warren Court has handled its insoluble dilemma.
While perhaps none of this by itself .is new, the pulling of it
8.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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together so openly and compactly is. The Cox approach is thus a step
toward developing a systematic legal-political theory of the Supreme
Court. His discussion of the familiar problems of racial discrimination
and the sit-in provides a good example of his approach at work and
indicates the kinds of points it permits the critic of the Court to make.
First, he expresses a deep personal sense of the gravity and urgency of
the Negro grievance in America and ranks it as the primary social
pressure bearing down on the Court. Second, he is not hesitant about
the substantive policy; racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation ought to be abolished. Third, in an extended passage
he examines various theories for expanding state action so as to enable
the Cout of its own motion to find segregation of public
accommodations unconstitutional. He finds each of them lacking and
unsuitable. He argues further that what is required is essentially a
legislative judgment which has the virtue that it can be arbitrary and
establish the necessary cut-off. He, therefore, concludes that the Court
played its double role properly in its repeated refusal to go this far. It
was better to leave the question to Congress, especially since there were
signs that Congress was stirring. It was a fairly routine legal step for
the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 under the commerce power. Moreover, Cox opines that the 1964
Act, "because of the participation of all three branches of government,
commanded far wider and deeper acceptance in all parts of the country
than would have been accorded to a Supreme Court decision abolishing
segregated public accommodations" (p. 39).
There are two further points about the matter. Cox applauds the
Court's ingenuity in upsetting each of the sit-in convictions while
nevertheless refusing to resolve the underlying issue of the legality of
segregated accommodations. The legal restraints on the Court made it
difficult for it to abolish the state action limitation and resolve the
social issue before it even though the substantive merits were very clear.
The politicAl function of the Court, on the other hand, made it urgent
that it not legitimate the discrimination by convicting the sitters-in and
that it keep pressure on Congress. Its role was to keep the momentum
for racial justice alive while it bought time awaiting action by
Congress, the proper agency of government for correcting the injustice.
Thus, in retrospect, the role of the Court was arguably modest and
politically astute.
The final point-a point about which Professor Cox evinces
considerable excitement-is the possibility that the Court will now be
creative in finding new sources of federal legislative power beyond the
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commerce clause. This is essentially the theme of his third chapter
which explores in detail the implications of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,9 Katzenbach v. Morgan,"° and United States v. Guest."
In the end, the role of the Court will have been to defer to Congress
while providing leadership and stimulus for the mitigation through law
of the Negro grievance.
The example seems instructive on several counts. It suggests-and
this is a basic Cox theme-that the Court has often been highly
deferential to Congress and, in that sense, a conservative influence. It
suggests also, and this is the Cox hope, the possibility of appraising
the work of the Court by placing it in a larger political context and
paying attention to its interaction with the other branches of
government. Additionally, it places the series of sit-in cases, with their
often thin rationalizations for upsetting the convictions, in a new light.
The Court was not going all out for Negro rights. 2 It was playing a
modest role as a partner in the governmental enterprise.
The success of the endeavor at criticism, of course, cannot rest on
a single example, however complex. The canons of criticism need to be
applied to the work of the Court in other areas and in other periods
of its history. The technique proved less productive in Cox's effort to
appraise the decisions on criminal procedure or .the decisions on free
speech and association. The reapportionment cases, however, do afford
the obvious example complementary to the sit-in cases. Here Cox
makes the familiar points that the value at stake was the high one of
the integrity of popular government itself; that if the Court did not
intervene there was no hope of any agency of government ever
correcting the problem; and that the intrusion insofar as there was one
was at the state level. He adds what appears to be an additional
criterion: it worked. The Court's action proved a catalyst. "The power
of the ruling in the reapportionment cases-their claim to be law-rests
upon the accuracy of the Court's perception and upon its ability, by
expressing the ideal, to command a national consensus" (p. 119).
The Supreme Court of the United States is our most interesting
legal institution. It is of high importance that we seek to understand
its role in American life and seek to supply rational criticism of its
9. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
10. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1i. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
12. The most challenging case on which to test these considerations must be Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), in which the Court found it necessary and possible to use the
Civil Rights Act as the basis for protecting conduct which had occurred prior to the passage of
the Act.
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performance in that role. To these tasks the Cox essay, by its
professional competence, its clarity, and its gallantry, makes a most
welcome contribution.
HARRY KALVEN, JR.*
Professor, Law School, University of Chicago.

